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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLIE BROWN CONSTRUCTION CO., : 
INC., a Nevada Corporation, 
CHARLIE BROWN and CARMA BROWN, : 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, : Case No. 
vs. : 
LEISURE SPORTS INCORPORATED, a : 
Nevada Corporation, WEST VILLAGE 
UNIT NO. ONE, MT. HOLLY RECREATION : Category 13 
community, CONRAD H. KONING, and 
AMY J. KONING, : 
Defendants-Respondents. : 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR 
WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
Defendants-Respondents, petition this Court, pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §78-2a-4 (1987) and R. Utah S. Ct. 42 et. seq. , to deny 
Appellant's Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
1. Are there special and important reasons for this Court to 
review a 3-0 decision by the Court of Appeals upholding a Trial 
Court's dismissal of an action on the grounds of delay, v/here the 
Appellate Court's analysis is based on a thorough review of the 
factual circumstances surrounding the dismissal, and its holding is 
based on prior decisions of this Court? 
2. Did the Court of Appeals err in failing to consider 
Appellants1 argument that the Trial Court was required to consider 
whether less drastic sanctions than dismissal would be appropriate, 
where that argument was not raised in the Trial Court, nor in 
Appellants' brief, but was first raised during oral arguments before 
the Appellate Court? 
OPINION OF COURT OF APPEALS 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals in this matter is reported 
at 740 P. 2d. 1368 (Utah App. 1987) and at 64 Utah Adv. Rep. 25. A 
copy of the slip opinion issued by the Court of Appeals is attached 
hereto as Appendix A. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The decision of the Court of Appeals was filed on August 17, 
1987. On September 14, 1987, Appellants sought and obtained an 
extension of time to file the within Petition to September 30, 1987. 
On or about October 30, 1987, Respondents sought and obtained an 
extension of time to file the within Brief in Opposition, to 
November 30, 1987. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §78-2a-4 (1987) , and this Brief in Opposition was timely 
filed pursuant to R. Utah S. Ct. 47. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. This is an action for specific 
performance of the Defendants' obligation to pave certain roads in a 
subdivision, and for damages, attorney's fees and other relief as 
authorized by contract and by applicable statutes. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Lower Courts. 
Plaintiffs' Complaint was filed on June 15, 1981. The Trial Court 
purported to dismiss ttie case, sua sponte, by Minute Entry entered 
on June 18, 1987. A copy of the Minute Entry was mailed to counsel 
for both parties. No order was prepared or signed by the Court. 
Defendants' attorney filed a Notice of Withdrawal on or about June 
25, 1984. More than eight months elapsed before Plaintiffs filed, 
on February 25, 1985, a motion to set aside the dismissal. 
Secretarial error was asserted by Plaintiffs' counsel for the delay 
after receipt of the Minute Entry. The matter was heard by the 
Court on March 18, 1985. At a hearing on March 18, 1985, the Court 
reviewed the entire file and considered arguments of counsel. The 
Court noting Plaintiffs' failure to diligently prosecute their 
lawsuit, affinned the dismissal and entered orders accordingly. 
Plaintiffs perfected an appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. The 
case was transferred by the Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals. 
After oral arguments, the Court of Appeals, by a 3-0 decision, 
affirmed the dismissal. 
C. Statement of Facts. Plaintiffs filed a Complaint on June 
15, 1981, to compel completion of certain road improvements. At 
Defendants1 request, Plaintiffs posted a non-resident cost bond 
pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 12 (j). Defendants then 
filed their Answer on July 6, 1981. 
Approximately ten and one-half months later, on May 27, 1982, 
Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Amend their Complaint and a notice to 
take Defendants, Conrad and Amy Koning's depositions (R. 15-16). At 
Defendants1 request, the depositions were postponed to July 9, 1982 
(R. 17). On June 14, a hearing was held on Plaintiffs' Motion to 
Amend their Complaint. Plaintiffs1 failed to appear and the Motion 
was denied subject to renewal at a later date (R. 19) . Plaintiffs 
never renewed the Motion. On June 21, 1982, John E. Maycock filed 
an appearance as Defendants1 co-counsel. Subsequently, Defendants' 
original counsel, Scott J. Thorley, withdrew (R. 20). 
On July 9, and 16, 1982, Defendants filed Motions for 
Protective Orders requesting their depositions not be taken. 
Defendants' based their Motions on Protective Orders issued in 
concurrent Federal litigation (R. 23-27) . The Court never ruled on 
the Motions, nor did Plaintiffs pursue their requested depositions. 
On April 4, 1983, some nine months after Defendants' Motions for 
Protective Orders, Plaintiffs filed Interrogatories with the Court. 
Plaintiffs1 counsel mistakenly mailed a set of the Interrogatories 
to Thorley, Defendants' former counsel. The Interrogatories were 
not mailed to Maycock, and Plaintiffs' counsel blamed this oversight 
on his secretary (Tr. page 3, lines 20-22). Thorley, having 
withdrawn from the case, never forwarded the Interrogatories to 
Maycock. 
After eight more months of inactivity, on December 5, 1983, the 
Court sua sponte filed an Order to Show Cause why the case should 
not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. The Court ordered the 
parties to appear on March 19, 1984. The Court also filed a Notice 
for a pretrial hearing, also set for March 19, 1984. Plaintiffs 
realized the error with the Interrogatories and entered into a 
Stipulation with Defendants allowing Defendants 30 more days to 
respond. The Stipulation also gratuitously stated, "This matter 
should be stricken from the Court's pretrial calendar until the 
parties have completed their discovery or until either party 
requests a pretrial conference." (R. 44). 
On the morning of March 19, 1984, Plaintiffs' counsel 
telephoned the Trial Court Judge and informed him of the 
Stipulation. A Minute Entry was filed noting that a continuance had 
been granted until April 16, and that neither party had appeared at 
the hearing (R. 42). On April 16, 1984, the Court again continued 
the matter for 60 days (R. 42). On April 30, 1984, the Trial Court 
sua sponte mailed notices to the parties setting trial for June 18, 
1984 (R. 45). Plaintiffs' counsel contacted the Trial Court 
Executive and explained the Stipulation (Tr. page 6, lines 10-12). 
Rather than vacating the date, the Trial Court Executive sent 
revised notices changing the trial setting to a pretrial hearing (R. 
46) . 
On June 15, 1984, Plaintiffs' counsel personally spoke to the 
Trial Court Judge and discussed the Stipulation and a possible 
settlement between the parties (Tr. page 6, lines 15-29). The Court 
allegedly excused the parties from appearing at the June 18 hearing 
(Tr. page 7, lines 1-4) . However, when the matter was called on 
June 18, and neither party was present, the Judge ordered the case 
dismissed. In a Minute Entry the Court stated: 
This matter was called on hearing for a pretrial 
conference. No one appeared on behalf of either party. 
This matter had been set several times for pretrial and 
no one had ever appeared. The Court ordered the matter 
dismissed with prejudice and on the merits. The Minute 
Entry will serve as the Order of Dismissal. A copy is to 
be mailed to the respective parties. (R. 48) 
Copies of the Minute Entry were mailed to both parties on June 
28, 1984 (R. 49). 
Due to error, allegedly on the part of Plaintiffs1 counsel's 
secretary, the Minute Entry did not come to Plaintiffs' counsel's 
attention until seven months later in January, 1985 (Tr. page 7, 
lines 13-24) . During this seven-month period, Maycock filed a 
Notice of Withdrawal (R. 50) and Defendants Koning, partially in 
reliance on the Minute Entry, sold their shares in co-defendant 
Leisure Sports, Inc. (R. 58). After becoming aware of the Minute 
Entry, on February 24, 1985, Plaintiffs' counsel filed a Motion to 
set aside the dismissal (R. 52-56). 
At a hearing on March 18, 1985, the Court reviewed the entire 
file, took evidence and heard arguments of counsel. The Court 
reviewed Plaintiffs' ten and one-half months delay after Defendants 
filed their Answer and Plaintiffs' failure to attend the hearing on 
their Motion to Amend their Complaint. The Court reviewed 
Plaintiffs' failure to pursue a ruling on Defendants' Motion for 
Protective Orders against the requested depositions. The Court 
reviewed another ten-month delay before Plaintiffs pursued another 
discovery devise, namely the Interrogatories. The Court also 
reviewed eight months more of delay before Plaintiffs discovered 
Defendants did not have the Interrogatories. Finally, and as noted 
by the Court in its Order denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Set Aside 
the Dismissal, the Court reviewed yet another eight months delay by 
Plaintiffs from the time notification of the Minute Entry was 
received until they filed a Motion to Set Aside the Dismissal. 
Charlie Brown Construction Co., Inc. vs. Leisure Sports Inc. 740 
P.2d 1368, 1370-1371 ( Utah App. 1987). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
NO SPECIAL OR IMPORTANT REASONS EXIST FOR THIS COURT 
TO REVIEW THE UNANIMOUS DECISION OF A THREE JUDGE APPEALS 
COURT PANEL WHICH UPHELD THE TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL 
OF AN ACTION ON THE GROUNDS OF DELAY 
Review by Writ of Certiorari is not a matter of right. 
R.Utah S. Ct. 43 sets forth considerations governing review of 
Certiorari, Rule 43 states: 
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of 
right, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted 
only when there are special and important reasons 
therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor 
wholly measuring the court's descretion, indicate the 
character of reasons that will be considered: 
(1) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered 
a decision in conflict with a decision of another panel of 
the Court of Appeals on the same issue of law; 
(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided 
a question of state or federal law in a way that is in 
conflict with a decision of this court; 
(3) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered 
a decision that has so far departed from the accepted and 
usual course of judicial proceedings or has so far 
sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call 
for an exercise of this court's power of supervision; or 
(4) When the Court of Appeals has decided an 
important question of municipal, state or federal law 
which has not been, but should be, settled by this court. 
This panel of the Court of Appeals has not rendered a decision 
in conflict with the decision of another panel of the Court of 
Appeals on the same issue of law. As discussed below, the holding 
of the Court of Appeals in the instant case is note in conflict with 
a decision of this court, nor has it so far departed from the 
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to call for an 
exercise of this court's power of supervision. No important 
question of municipal, state, or federal law has been settled by the 
appellate court's decision in this matter. Therefore, it would be a 
wasteful use of this court's time to grant the Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari in this case. 
A
* UTAH LAW IS WELL SETTLED WHERE DELAY IS THE GROUNDS FOR 
DISMISSING A LAWSUIT. 
Dismissal for failure to prosecute is a decision within the 
broad discretion of the trial court. Grundmann v. Williams & 
Peterson, 685 P.2d 538 (Utah 1984); Wilson v. Lambert, 613 P.2d 765 
(Utah 1980); Department of Soc. Serv. v. Romero, 609 P.2d 1323 (Utah 
1980). This court has stated that it "will not interfere with that 
decision unless it clearly appears that the court has abused its 
discretion and that there is a likelihood that injustice has been 
wrought. Department of Soc. Serv. v. Romero, supra, 609 P. 2d at 
1324. See also, Reliance National Life Ins. Co. v. Cain, 555 P.2d 
276 (Utah 1976) (If that discretion has substance in believable, 
admissible evidence, though controversial in nature, appellate 
review calls for affirmance.) 
Because of the discretionary power granted to the trial judge, 
each case must be decided based on the totality of its own unique 
facts and circumstances; included therein is the conduct of both 
parties and the opportunity each has had to move the case forward if 
they so desire, and also what, if any, difficulty or prejudice may 
have been caused to the other party by the delay, and most 
important, whether it appears that any injustice has resulted. 
Department of Soc. Serv. v. Romero, supra, 609 P.2d at 1324. 
Because of the unique factual circumstances inherent in every 
case, there has developed a large body of Utah law where this court 
has used the above criteria to review a trial court's dismissal of 
an action due to delay. On appeal each case is separately analyzed 
on its own unique facts and circumstances. See eg. Grundmann v. 
Williams & Peterson, 685 P.2d 538 (Utah 1984); K.L.C. Inc. v. 
McLean, 656 P.2d 986 (Utah 1982); Wilson v. Lambert, supra; 
Department of Soc. Serv. v. Romero, supra; Utah Oil Co, v. Harris, 
565 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1977); Polk v. Ivers, 561 P.2d 1075 (Utah 1977); 
Johnson v. Firebrand, Inc., 571 P.2d 1368 (Utah 1977); Maxfieid v. 
Fishier, 538 P.*2d 1323 (Utah 1975); Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. 
Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975); Crystal 
Lime & Cement Co. v. Robbins, 8 Utah 2d 389, 335 P.2d 624 (1959). 
B. THE APPELLATE COURT'S HOLDING IN THIS CASE IS CONSISTENT 
WITH CASE LAW AS SET FORTH BY THIS COURT, 
The instant case is reported at 740 P.2d 1368 (Utah 1987). The 
Appellate Court's opinion begins with an exhaustive recitation of 
the facts. 740 P.2d at 1369-1371. 
The most important fact in this case is that on March 18, 1985, 
the trial court held a hearing on Plaintiff's motion to set aside 
the dismissal. At that time, the court reviewed the entire file and 
considered arguments of counsel. Referring to that fact, the 
Appellate Court stated as follows: 
At the March 18 hearing on plaintiffs' motion to set aside 
the dismissal, the court reviewed the entire file. The 
court reviewed plaintiffs' ten and one-half months delay 
after defendants filed their answer and plaintiffs' 
failure to attend the hearing on their motion to amend 
their complaint. The court reviewed plaintiffs1 failure 
to pursue a ruling on defendants1 motion for protective 
orders against the requested depositions. The court 
reviewed another ten month delay before plaintiffs pursued 
another discovery device, namely the interrogatories. The 
court also reviewed eight months" more of delay before 
plaintiffs discovered defendants did not have the 
interrogatories. Finally/ and as noted by the court in 
its order denying plaintiffs' motion to set aside the 
dismissal, the court reviewed yet another eight months 
delay by plaintiffs from the time notification of the 
minute entry was received until they filed a motion to set 
aside the dismissal. 740 P.2d at 1370-1371. 
Based on these facts, the Appellate Court found that the case 
to be in line with Maxfield v. Fishier, 538 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1978), 
where this court affirmed the trial court's dismissal with prejudice 
against the plaintiff for "inexcuseable neglect and failing to 
prepare and prosecute her claim with reasonable diligence." Supra, 
538 P.2d at 1324-25. The Appellate Court summed up its analysis by 
stating as follows: 
In the instant case, the trial court provided plaintiffs 
"an opportunity to be heard and do justice." Westinghouse 
Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 
P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975). 
Plaintiffs nevertheless abused their opportunity through 
dilatory conduct. 
We therefore find no abus£ of discretion and affirm the 
trial court's order denying plaintiff's motion to set 
aside the dismissal. 740 P.2d at 1371. 
Under the standards set forth by this Court, the Appellate 
panel found substantial believable and admissible evidence to 
support the trial court's discretion in dismissing the lawsuit for 
delay. It would be a waste of this court's time to once again 
review the circumstances surrounding the dismissal. 
POINT II 
MATTERS NOT RAISED IN THE TRIAL COURT ARE 
NOT TO BE CONSIDERED ON APPEAL, 
Point II of Appellate's Petition deals with whether the Court 
of Appeals should have considered lesser sanctions than a dismissal 
on the merits. Page 16, Lines 2-5 of Appellant's Petition states as 
follows: "Plaintiffs raised this argument before the Court of 
Appeals at oral argument, but the court apparently failed to 
consider the argument." 
This court has "consistently held that matters not raised in 
the trial court will not be considered by this court on appeal." 
Department of Soc. Serv. v. Romero, supra, 609 P.2d at 3324. In 
this case, Plaintiffs did not raise the matter as an issue at any 
time in the lower court proceedings. Neither was the issue raised 
in plaintiffs1 appeal brief to the Court of Appeals. The first time 
the argument appears is, as plaintiffs state in their Petition, at 
oral arguments before the Court of Appeals. 
In addition, this court has never required trial courts to 
consider whether anything less than dismissal on the merits would be 
appropriate in cases dismissed for delay. 
Therefore, this court should not consider Point II of 
appellant's petition. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs are required "to prosecute their claims uith aue 
diligence, or accept the penalty of dismissal." Maxfield v. Fishier, 
supra, 538 P. 2d at 1325. In the instant case, the Appellate Court 
carefully reviewed the circumstances surrounding the dismissal for 
delay. It properly applied existing case law propounded by this 
Court to the unique facts in this case. It found that the trial 
court provided plaintiffs an opportunity to be heard and to do 
justice, but that plaintiffs abused theiir opportunity through 
Hi2atery conduct. 
Inasmuch as the Appellate Court reviewed this case under the 
accepted standards set forth by this court, there are no special or 
important reasons for this court to review this matter. Indeed, it 
would be a wasteful repetition to do so. 
WHEREFORE, this court should deny appellant's Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari pursuant to R. Utah S. Ct 48(c). 
DATED this 28th day of November, 1987. 
l&tfSSell 0. Gallian and 
\Jeffrey^C. Wilcox 
Galiian'' & Westfall 
Attorneys for Defendants/ 
Respondents 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
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Jackson Howard and 
Leslie W. Slaugh 
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Attorneys for Appellants 
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Timothy M. Shea 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Apccais 
Plaintiffs appeal an order of the district court denying 
their motion to set aside the dismissal of their complaint. We 
affirm. 
Plaintiffs are the purchasers and owners of certain lots 
at Mount Holly Ski Resort. Defendants are the developers of 
the area. On June 15, 1981, plaintiffs filed a complaint 
against defendants to compel completion of certain road 
improvements. At defendants' request, plaintiffs posted a 
non-resident cost bond pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 12(j). 
Defendants then filed their answer on July 6, 1981. 
Ten and one-half months later, en May 2 * t T r> r\ *n X 2 Q 4 , 
plaintiffs filed a motion to amend their complaint and a notice 
to take defendants Conrad and Amy Koning's depositions. At 
defendants* request, the depositions were postponed to July 9, 
1982. On June 14, a hearing was held on plaintiffs1 motion to 
amend their complaint. Plaintiffs failed to appear and the 
motion was denied subject to renewal at a later date. On June 
21, 1982, John B. Maycock filed an appearance as defendants1 
co-counsel. Subsequently, defendants' original counsel, Scott 
J. Thorley, withdrew. 
On July 9 and 16, 1982, defendants filed motions for 
protective orders requesting their depositions not be taken. 
Defendants based their motions on protective.orders issued in 
concurrent federal*litigation. The court never ruled on the 
motions, nor did plaintiffs pursue their requested 
depositions* Plaintiffs filed interrogatories with the court 
on April 4, 1983, nine months after defendants1 motions for 
protective orders. Plaintiffs* counsel mistakenly mailed a set 
of the interrogatories to Thorley, defendants' former counsel, 
who never forwarded the interrogatories to Maycock. 
On December 5, 1983, after eight more months of 
inactivity, the court sua sponte filed an order to show cause 
why the case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. 
The court ordered both parties to appear on March 19, 1984. 
Failure to appear "[would] be considered as acquiescence to 
entry of an order of dismissal and the judgment [would] be 
entered by the Court without further notice to the parties." 
The court also filed a notice for a pre-trial hearing, also set 
for March 19, 1984. Plaintiffs realized the error with the 
interrogatories and entered into a stipulation with defendants 
allowing defendants thirty more days to respond. The 
stipulation also gratuitously stated, "this matter should be 
stricken from the Court's Pre-Trial Calendar until the parties 
have completed their discovery or until either party requests a 
Pre-Trial Conference." 
The morning of March 19, plaintiffs' counsel telephoned 
the trial court judge and informed him of the stipulation. The 
trial court excused the parties' absence and in a second order 
to show cause continued the pre-trial to April 16, 1984. A 
transmittal letter, which referred to the telephone 
conversation and the stipulation, was filed on March 22. On 
April 16, 1984, the court again continued the matter for sixty 
days. A signed stipulation was filed on April 19, 1984. On 
April 30, 1984, the trial court sua sponte mailed notices to 
the parties setting trial for June 18, 1984. Plaintiffs 
contacted the trial court executive and explained the 
stipulation. The trial court executive, rather than vacating 
the date, sent revised notices changing the trial setting to a 
pre-trial hearing. 
On June 15, 1984, plaintiffs' counsel personally spoke to 
the trial court judge in St, George. Counsel explained the 
stipulation and informed the judge a settlement was likely. 
The court allegedly excused the parties from appearing at the 
June 18 hearing. However, when the matter was called on June 
18 and neither party was present, the judge ordered the case 
dismissed. In a minute entry, the court stated: 
This matter was called on hearing for a 
Pre-Trial Conference. No one appeared on 
behalf of either party. This matter had 
been set several times for pre-trial and 
8601 TQ-n 
no one had ever appeared. The Court 
ordered the matter dismissed with 
prejudice and on the merits. The minute 
entry will serve as the Order of 
Dismissal. A copy is to be mailed to the 
respective parties. 
The court clerk mailed copies of the unsigned minute entry to 
both parties on June 28. 
Due to error, allegedly on the part of plaintiffs' 
counsel's secretary, the minute entry did not come to 
plaintiffs' counsel's attention until seven months later in 
January, 1985. ^  When plaintiffs' counsel became aware of the 
minute entry, he attempted to consult with the trial court and 
defendants. Unable to do so, he filed a motion on February 25 
to set aside the dismissal. At a hearing on March 18, 1985, 
t&e court reviewed the entire file and considered arguments of 
counsel.2 The court, noting plaintiffs' failure diligently 
to prosecute their lawsuit, affirmed the dismissal and entered 
orders accordingly. 
On appeal, plaintiffs contend the trial court erred in 
denying plaintiffs' motion to set aside the dismissal. 
Plaintiffs argue under Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b) the court has no 
authority to dismiss for failure to prosecute absent a motion 
by defendants. The rule states, "For failure of the plaintiff 
to prosecute or comply with these rules or any order of court, 
a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim 
against him." The language in Rule 41(b) merely permits, not 
requires, a motion by defendant. The Utah Supreme Court, in 
Brasher Motor and Finance Co. v. Brown, 23 Utah 2d 247, 461 
P.2d 464, 464-65 (1969), states, "In dismissing an action for 
want of prosecution, the court may proceed under [Rule 41(b)], 
or it may, of its own motion, take action to that end." See 
also Wilson v. Lambert, 613 P.2d 765, 768 (Utah 1980). Under 
the comparable federal rule, the United States Supreme Court 
similarly held: 
1. During this seven month period, Maycock filed a notice of 
withdrawal and defendants Konings, in reliance on the minute 
entry, sold their shares in co-defendant Leisure Sports, Inc. 
2. Defendants opposed plaintiffs' motion, arguing their counsel 
never had been authorized to enter into any stipulation to delay 
the action. The claim is of questionable relevance and is not a 
factor in our decision. 
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Neither the permissive language of the 
Rule—which merely authorizes a mo_tion by 
the defendant—nor its policy requires us 
to conclude that it was the purpose of the 
Rule to abrogate the power of courts, 
acting on their own initiative/ to clear 
their calendars of cases that have 
remained dormant because of the inaction 
or dilatoriness of the parties seeking 
relief. The authority of a court to 
dismiss sua sponte for lack of prosecution 
has generally been considered an "inherent 
power," governed not by rule or statute 
but by the control necessarily vested in 
courts to manage their own affairs so as 
to achieve the orderly and expeditious 
disposition of cases* 
Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U. S. 626, 630-31 (1962). 
As stated in Lake Meredith Reservoir Co. v. Amity Mutual 
Irrigation Co., 698 P.2d 1340, 1344 (Colo. 1985), "The burden 
is upon the plaintiff to prosecute a case in due course without 
unusual or unreasonable delay." Plaintiffs are required "to 
prosecute their claims with due diligence, or accept the 
penalty of dismissal." Maxfield v. Fishier, 538 P.2d 1323, 
1325 (Utah 1975). Dismissal for failure to prosecute is a 
decision within the broad discretion of the trial court. This 
Court will not interfere with that decision unless it clearly 
appears that the court has abused its discretion and that there 
is a likelihood an injustice has been wrought. Department of 
Soc. Serv. v. Romero, 609 P.2d 1323, 1324 (Utah 1980). 
At the March 18 hearing on plaintiffs' motion to set aside 
the dismissal, the court reviewed the entire file. The court 
reviewed plaintiffs* ten and one-half months delay after 
defendants filed their answer and plaintiffs* failure to attend 
the hearing on their motion to amend their complaint. The 
court reviewed plaintiffs4 failure to pursue a ruling on 
defendants* motion for protective orders against the requested 
depositions. The court reviewed another ten month delay before 
plaintiffs pursued another discovery device, namely the 
interrogatories. The court also reviewed eight months more of 
delay before plaintiffs discovered defendants did not have the 
interrogatories. Finally, and as noted by the court in its 
order denying plaintiffs* motion to set aside the dismissal, 
the court reviewed yet another eight months delay by plaintiffs 
from the time notification of the minute entry was received 
until they filed a motion to set aside the dismissal. 
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Plaintiffs argue the court erred in dismissing their action 
in light of the court's alleged "excusa1 of'both parties* 
appearance at the June 18 hearing. Plaintiffs contend the 
trial court was bound by the parties* prior stipulation to 
postpone any pre-trial conference which was communicated to and 
filed with the court. However, a trial court is not 
necessarily bound by a mere stipulation between parties which 
has not been incorporated in an order where the stipulation 
attempts to wrest from the court control of its own calendar. 
Saa taKe ffmflith* 698 p.2d at 1346. 
Regardless of whether the trial court never knew of, 
ignored, or simply forgot about the stipulation, plaintiffs 
themselves failed to comply with the intent of the 
stipulation. The primary purpose of the stipulation was to 
provide defendants an additional thirty days to respond to the 
interrogatories. When the thirty day period expired and no 
response had been received, plaintiffs did not move under Utah 
R. Civ* P. 37 for an order compelling discovery nor attempt in 
any way to move the case forward. 
Plaintiffs do not claim the stipulation as an excuse for 
any of their numerous delays. Rather, plaintiffs* counsel 
asserts secretarial error as an excuse for the delay after 
receipt of the minute entry. Generally, law office delays or 
failures are unacceptable excuses for failure to prosecute. 
Valente v. First Western Savings and Loan Ass'n, 528 P.2d 699, 
700 (Nev. 1974). 
Plaintiffs last argue the trial court erred in dismissing 
their action with prejudice and on the merits. Rule 41(b) 
states, "Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise 
specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal 
not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack 
of jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of an 
indispensable party, operates as an adjudication upon the 
merits.** Plaintiffs cite three Utah Supreme Court cases which 
reversed a trial court's dismissal with prejudice as an abuse 
of discretion. Johnson v. Firebrand, Inc., 571 P.2d 1368 (Utah 
1977) (motion to dismiss filed at the same time as defendant's 
answer); Utah Oil Co. v. Harris, 565 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1977) 
(delay due to settlement negotiations); Crystal Lime & Cement 
Co. v. Robbins, 8 Utah 2d 389, 335 P.2d 624 (1959) (failure to 
consider counterclaims). These three cases are readily 
distinguishable. The facts of this case are much closer to 
those of Maxfield v. Fishier, 538 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1975). In 
Maxfield. the Utah Supreme Court affirmed a trial court's 
dismissal with prejudice against the plaintiff for "inexcusable 
neglect in failing to prepare and prosecute her claim with 
reasonable diligence.- I&. at 1324-25. In the instant case, 
the trial court provided plaintiffs "an opportunity to be heard 
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and to do justice." Westinohouse Eler. Supply Co. v. Paul W. 
Larsen Cnntractor. Inc.. 544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975). 
Plaintiffs nevertheless abused their opportunity through 
dilatory conduct. 
We therefore find no abuse of discretion and affirm the 
trial court's order denying plaintiffs' motion to set aside the 
dismissal. Costs to defendants. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
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